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Production Diary of the Debates 
HERBERT A. SELTZ & RICHARD D. YOAKAM 
THE FORUM for the 1960 presidential election was the living room 
of the American home. Because the debates were televised, few could 
avoid contact with them. Every word said on these programs was 
weighed by the editorial writers and pundits. Every motion made in 
front of the television camera was examined for meaning. Every eye-
blink, every bead of perspiration, every exhibition of strength or weak-
ness, sureness or doubt, was magnified as never before. Whether voting 
decisions were conditioned by what the voters saw has been the con-
cern of others in this book. Our subject is the examination of the 
influences and pressures which ultimately shaped the four debates into 
what they were. Through study of the debates as TV programs, and 
through interviews with the production personnel, technical operators, 
network executives, political advisers, and observers, we have brought 
together this production diary of four television programs which be-
came milestones in U. S. political history.1 
If anyone thinks it was a simple matter to arrange a face-to-face 
meeting between presidential candidates, he is unaware of the com-
plexities and impact of the mass media. 2 It was not just a matter of 
agreeing to dates and then showing up at the appointed TV studio on 
time. On the one hand, the American broadcasting industry was able 
to present such debates legally for the first time and was painfully 
conscious of the possible far-reaching consequences.s On the other 
hand, the candidates-both seasoned radio and television performers 
-and their advisers, both political and technical, realized the tre-
mendous impact of the media with its "winner-take-all" implications. 
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Throughout the discussions of Section 315, it was clear that the 
networks were going to provide extensive free time for the candidates 
in the 1960 election, either under existing "equal time" provisions or 
under the desired suspension. Some of the proposals made by the net-
works included time for the candidates to appear on existing or spe-
cially designed public affairs programs. The major proposals by CBS, 
ABC, and NBC for the debate series in this campaign were first made 
by network officials in the spring of 1960.4 The networks' formal pro-
posals were made to both candidates immediately after Nixon's nomi-
nation in Chicago, July 27. That same evening NBC announced its 
"Great Debates" proposal. Apparently the NBC offer reached Ken-
nedy first, and he accepted eagerly and without qualifications.5 Nixon 
stated his acceptance through his press secretary, Herbert Klein, the 
same day, and confirmed it three days later. The other network pro-
posals were also quickly accepted. Since both candidates favored the 
debates, it is not surprising that the House of Representatives approved 
Senate Joint Resolution 207 (suspending Section 315) on August 24, 
during its post-convention session. 
THE FORMAT 
The "Meet the Press" proposal, the debate idea, and Vice President 
Nixon's formal acceptance wire all played major roles in determining 
the formats for the programs which were planned during the next six 
weeks. The details were hammered out in twelve meetings between a 
committee of network news executives and the representatives named 
by the candidates. For the networks, the committee consisted of Wil-
liam McAndrew, Executive Vice President for News, NBC; Sig Mickel-
son, President, CBS News Inc.; John Daly, Vice President for News, 
ABC; and Joseph Keating, Vice President, MBS. Leonard Reinsch 
served as the chief adviser for Senator Kennedy, and William Wilson 
was his production adviser for radio and television; Fred C. Scribner 
Jr., Under Secretary of the Treasury, served as Nixon's chief repre-
sentative, with Herbert Klein and Caroll P. Newton as advisers for 
radio-TV, and Edward (Ted) Rogers as technical adviser for radio 
and TV during the campaign.6 
The first meeting took place at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New 
York on August 9. It was agreed then that "debates were desirable," 
that they should be on all networks simultaneously, one hour in length, 
end by October 21, and be worked into the candidates' travel schedules 
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by mutual agreement.7 The Democrats wanted a later closing date but 
agreed to October 21. Subsequent meetings between the candidates' 
representatives helped to determine the dates. And, according to net-
work representatives, the candidates' teams also talked about the for-
mat. 8 Nixon, in his acceptance wire, gave the following general outline 
of what he wanted: "joint television appearances of the presidential 
candidates should be conducted as full and free exchange of views, 
without prepared texts or notes, and without interruptions . . . and 
with time for questioning by panels of accredited joumalists."9 The 
network committee also came up with proposals. All of these ideas 
were discussed at a meeting in the Mayflower Hotel in Washington on 
August 31, where the formats were established although, apparently, 
not agreed upon. 
Formats for the first and fourth debates were quickly approved: 
opening statements, questions from the news panel, and closing state-
ments. Kennedy drew the first position in the first debate, a tum of 
fate his advisers considered very important. Nixon, therefore, went 
first on the last debate. The candidates' representatives also gave the 
networks the dates and the cities agreed upon. The place of the second 
debate was later changed twice, and its date was moved up twenty-four 
hours. 10 
The format for the first and fourth meetings was the choice of the 
candidates' representatives. At the August 31 meeting the networks, 
led by Mickelson, proposed that the candidates engage in what is 
known as "Oregon Debate."ll Under this form, debaters present open-
ing statements, then are permitted to question each other directly. 
This suggestion was rejected by the candidates' representatives.12 
Neither the networks nor the candidates' teams were in favor of an 
outright debate, on the ground that it would not hold an audience. 
Furthermore, a major consideration for a good debate must be a rela-
tively narrow, clear-cut issue, on which the debaters can take definite 
stands. However, the candidates' representatives were frank to admit 
no such clear-cut issue existed in the campaign. While the candidates 
disagreed on methods and approach, degree and application of policy 
on both foreign and domestic issues, their representatives and the net-
works feared that use of a debate format to present such "shades of 
grey" arguments would result in rapidly diminishing interest from the 
audience. In the immediate background were the West Virginia pri-
mary debates between Kennedy and Hubert Humphrey. Both men had 
been overly polite and the results had been disappointing. The debate 
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format, in the view of at least one of the leading representatives, held 
hidden traps because accuracy of statements could not be checked 
immediately, and because one of the candidates, in the heat of an argu-
ment, could make an injudicious remark which would have immediate 
international repercussions.13 
All of these considerations seemed to have prompted the candidates' 
representatives to insist upon the interposition of ' a panel of newsmen 
who would ask the questions. The representatives of both the candi-
dates and the networks felt that such a format was well known to the 
American TV audience. To be fair, it must be pointed out that Nixon's 
telegram suggests a form closer to a straight debate than that used in 
the actual programs. The "Meet the Press" type of program, however, 
was specifically urged by Nixon's representatives during the negotia-
tions. Kennedy's representatives said that they were not as interested 
in the format as in getting the Senator on the same TV program with 
the Vice President. They realized Kennedy's skill with the question and 
answer setup, and were really happier with it than with a straight 
debate format.14 
Final format of the second and third debates was not established at 
the August 31 meeting. The candidates' representatives wanted the 
form that finally appeared on the air-question to candidate A, answer, 
comment by candidate B, question to candidate B, answer, comment 
by candidate A. The network representatives objected to this form, 
claiming it would be confusing to the audience and would not permit 
much follow-up or expansion of views. They continued to battle for 
the "Oregon Debate" system up to a few days before the second debate 
went on the air in Washington; but they never succeeded. 
Concerning the subject areas of the first and fourth debates, it is not 
clear how the idea of having one program devoted solely to domestic 
issues and another solely to foreign policy evolved, but once the idea of 
having a news panel ask the questions was established, it must have 
become clear that some control over the direction of at least some of 
the programs would have to be exercised. 
With the moderator-news panel format rather firmly entrenched, the 
question of who would serve in these roles also became an issue. The 
various factions wrestled with the idea of using a public figure as mod-
erator. Along with other notables, the President of the American Bar 
Association was suggested. In the end, all sides agreed on a TV pro-
fessional to be selected by the network responsible for a given debate. 
The selection of the news panel was a more difficult problem. Since 
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the networks were putting on the programs, they insisted that the 
panels for programs one and four be made up of network newsmen, 
but agreed to 50-50 representation between the electronic and print 
media on debates two and three. Not more than ten days before the 
first debate, however, Press Secretaries Pierre Salinger and Herbert 
Klein opened the question again with a protest-that the lack of news-
paper reporters on the panels was discriminatory. But the networks 
stuck to their guns, and told Klein and Salinger to devise a method 
for picking the print media representatives on debates two and three. 
An elaborate lottery system was established by the press secretaries to 
provide for newspaper, wire service, and magazine representation as 
the argument concerning discrimination went on right up to the day 
of the first debate. There is evidence that Senator Kennedy was push-
ing most strongly for more newspaper representation; the Republicans 
do not seem to have been as much involved in this discussion. Imme-
diately after the first debate, Klein, who was prompted by requests, 
suggested the possibility of representation on the panel of special inter-
est groups such as the civil rights advocates. The networks rejected the 
suggestion on the ground that it would be impossible to satisfy all. 
Shortly after the August 9 agreement that there would be debates, 
at least one network received inquiries from prospective sponsors as to 
whether the programs would be for sale. When the question was raised 
by House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee chairman 
Oren Harris, NBC publicly explained that it would consider sponsor-
ship of the programs unless the candidates objected.15 At the August 
31 meeting, it was announced that there would be no sponsorship. 
Each of the decisions and discussions we have outlined was reflected 
in the productions as they appeared on the air. The overriding atten-
tion to detail, the attempts on all sides to add a touch here and gain 
an advantage there was a prelude to what everyone-with 20-20 
hindsight-now refers to as "four simple panel shows; but what a cast!" 
Opening Night 
First Debate 
Date: September 26, 1960, 9:30 EST, CBS 
Place: TV #1, WBBM-TV, Chicago, Illinois 
Producer-Director: Don Hewitt, CBS, New York 
Designers: Lou Dorfsman and M. Chomsky, CBS, New York 
Lighting: Bob Barry, CBS, New York 
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Makeup: Frances Arvold, CBS, New York 
Timer: Sig Mickelson, President, CBS News Inc. 
Technical Supervisors: Robert Hammer and Robert Sammon for 
CBS; AI Pierce for WBBM-TV 
Moderator: Howard K. Smith, CBS 
Panel: Robert Fleming, ABC; Stuart Novins, CBS; Sander Vanocur, 
NBC; Charles Warren, MBS 
Format: Domestic issues. Opening statements of eight minutes, ques-
tions and answers covering statements and domestic issues, closing 
statements of three minutes. 
The task of being the first network ever to telecast and broadcast a 
live debate between two presidential candidates fell, by lot, to CBS. 
Chicago was picked as the site for the first debate in order to accom-
modate the candidates-particularly Kennedy's campaign schedule. 
The CBS-owned-and-operated station, WBBM-TV, had facilities 
which were ideal for the occasion. Furthermore, WBBM had the neces-
sary room to accommodate the traveling press corps. WBBM-TV 
studio TV-I, which is 80 by 65 feet, includes a large fly area over one 
end of the studio, a modern light control board with complete dimming 
and patching facilities, and is in all respects a first-rate production 
facility. 
On September 8, after drawing the assignment, CBS officials had a 
general production meeting. Agreement was reached on the matters of 
positioning the candidates and the news panel, and the general actions 
which would take place during the debate. In addition, they agreed 
that a special set would be built for the program. CBS President Frank 
Stanton took a close personal interest in the program and in particular, 
the set. Stanton is well known for his interests in design and the arts, 
and the set was designed for his personal approval.16 
Lou Dorfsman was assigned the job of coordinating the set design, 
which CBS wanted as simple as possible to avoid distracting the view-
ers. Dorfsman said, "The set would be considered in sophisticated 
design circles as a fine set; even though it was not an exercise in out-
standing TV set design, but an exercise in staying away from the two 
important elements-the candidates themselves."17 The chairs for the 
candidates were personally selected by Dr. Stanton; they were Hans 
Wegner chairs borrowed from Stanton's executive office. The total 
effect attempted was one of "clean, uncluttered, modern design." 
A week later, in Chicago, the final sketch of the set was shown to the 
candidates' representatives and it was approved. The background 
Photo courtesy of CBS 
Debate traffic control: The first floor of WBBM-TV, Chicago, showing the traffic and 
security control for the first debate. The shaded area is the "red," or most secure, area, 
which includes the debate studio, the candidates' offices, and the entrance ramp along 
which the candidates' cars drove. 
First minutes: View of the first debate, September 26, 1960. Senator Kennedy's image 
as he makes his opening remarks is seen on the control room monitor, lower right. 
Timekeeper Sig Mickelson is shown in center foreground, Vice President Nixon is 
seated right of center. The clock shows the debate has been on the air about two 
minutes. Men shown seated just below the candidates are members of the press panel. 
Photo courtesy of CBS 
Photo courteB1/ of CBS 
During set and lighting adjustment: CBS President Frank Stanton, kneeling left, studies the 
lighting effects on the set wall as shown through a TV monitor. Kneeling right is Lou Dorfs-
man, CBS advertising and sales promotion creative director, who supervised set design. 
Standing are, left to right, Leonard Reinsch, Kennedy's chief TV adviser, and Don Hewitt, 
CBS debate producer-director. 
Reporters cover the TV debate: A portion of the huge corps of reporters who covered 
the second debate at NBC Washington, October 7, 1960. TV monitors, through which the 
reporters viewed the debate, are set up against the outside wall of the debate studio. 
Photo courtesy of NBC 
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chosen was a painted pattern of squares, given perspective by shading 
in a light grey color. This color was intended to equal No. 5-a middle 
tone-on the TV grey scale. The set had a curved back wall, 9 feet 
high by 39 feet long. The entire set-back wall, desks, chairs, podia-
was placed on a platform eighteen inches high. In addition to the 
chairs for the candidates, there was a chair for the moderator, and 
lecterns which can best be described as austere music stands. The 
original design also included a large, moulded, spread-winged eagle 
symbol, which was to be mounted in the center of the back wall. IS 
The set was built in New York, set up in the CBS scene shop at the 
CBS Production Center, and viewed by various people, including the 
set designer. It was not seen by the producer-director or the lighting 
director, nor was it viewed on camera in New York. Such previews, as 
we will see, could have saved much time and trouble. 
The set arrived in Chicago Saturday, September 24. Robert Link, 
WBBM-TV Production Manager, brought in a crew and the set was 
erected in TV # 1 that day and evening. As Director Don Hewitt 
watched the setup, he immediately decided that the background tone 
was too light, and he ordered it repainted to bring it to the grey scale 
of # 5 as originally prescribed. Hewitt, Dorfsman, and Stanton then 
became involved, along with the candidates' representatives, in a long 
series of discussions and changes in the dressing of the set which took 
almost two hundred man-hours to complete, and covered the next 
thirty-six hours in time.19 Major aspects of this re-dressing included, 
in order: repainting the set to a darker tone at about 11 A.M. Sunday, 
September 25, relaying and restitching of the green carpeting which 
covered the candidates' platform, and building new furniture for the 
principals and the moderator. 
The candidates' representatives asked that moderator Smith be 
seated behind a desk so that there would be more separation between 
the candidates and they requested that small tables with carafes be 
placed near the candidates' chairs. Since the addition of this furniture 
confused the original design concept, there was much resistance on 
the part of the CBS executives. Several people went looking for fur-
niture in Chicago. The designer drew plans, and furniture was built 
in the WBBM shop. This home-made furniture was later rejected. 
The decorative eagle design for the back of the set was removed. Early 
in the setup period, Hewitt had pictures taken of the set from the 
various shooting angles he proposed to use. These pictures were proc-
essed Saturday evening, and Hewitt met Kennedy and Reinsch at the 
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Chicago airport Sunday morning to show them the pictures, spending 
about fifteen minutes discussing the production details with the candi-
date. He had no similar meeting with Nixon, although Hewitt had 
requested it. 
The most complicated set change was not decided upon until about 
noon on the day of the debate, and was not completed until late after-
noon. Dr. Stanton, whenhe viewed the set on camera after it had been 
repainted, still felt that the background was too "busy." A gauze 
scrim, long enough to cover the entire curved back wall of the set, was 
rented. Since the back wall was curved, the mounting of the scrim was 
no small task. 20 
Robert Barry, senior lighting director for CBS, was assigned to the 
lighting of the debates about two weeks in advance. He had seen a 
model and a sketch of the set in New York, but had not viewed it at 
the time of the trial setup in the shop. He arrived in Chicago, Friday, 
September 23, and "roughed in" his lighting while the set was being 
installed Sunday. But a detailed lighting job was held up because of 
the difficulties in redressing the set, and by a controversy between 
Hewitt and the candidates' representatives over the placement of the 
lecterns for the candidates. Hewitt wanted them closer together, and 
kept moving them to the accompaniment of protests from Rogers and 
Wilson. 
Barry was in on the decision to darken the set. He, too, recognized 
that the lightness of the background would make it difficult for the 
television tube to differentiate between the flesh tones of the candidates' 
faces and the grey scale value of the set. TV # 1 is equipped with a 
five-scene preset lighting control board with more than enough dim-
mers for each light to be connected to a separate dimmer. Barry said 
he approached the lighting job with the idea that it would be conven-
tional. He put up key, fill, and back lights, and lit the background so 
that its light intensity could be controlled separately. Bruce Allan, one 
of Nixon's advisers, asked that Barry avoid "modeling" when lighting 
the Vice President; that he avoid sharply defined facial contours and 
shadows. This was done. By the time Barry had placed all of his lights, 
the set was covered with about 125 foot-candles of intensity. Nixon's 
advisers had requested the addition of two 500-watt spotlights shining 
up into the Vice President's eyes; one aimed at the level of his seated 
position, the other at the podium position. These were placed on the 
floor about twelve feet in front of the platform and were directed 
upward at about a 35-degree angle. Nixon's chief adviser, Ted Rogers, 
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had prescribed these lights for Nixon wherever he went. From Rogers' 
point of view, there was nothing unusual about the addition of these 
two lights. Rogers, who told the authors that Nixon was an extremely 
difficult subject to light, said, "He's critical on television; there's an 
enormous contrast between his very pale, white translucent skin, and 
his jet black hair."21 
Barry said the Nixon advisers pressed him for the addition of the 
floor lights during most of the day of the debate, and that they were 
added by 5 P.M., when the lighting job was finished. Barry was opposed 
to adding the lights because the height of the platform and the rela-
tively low angle of the cameras would have forced the cameras to 
shoot upward and into Nixon's eyes anyway. However, he acceded to 
the request, and all parties said they were satisfied with the lights, set, 
and general production details at least two hours before air time. 
About 7: 30, one hour before air time, the candidates arrived at 
WBBM and were driven inside the building along a wide production 
corridor behind the studio. Nixon arrived first, Kennedy only a few 
minutes later, and each was greeted by the executives of all the net-
works. When Nixon went on camera for a pre-show check, his repre-
sentatives were in the control room. They asked for certain lighting 
changes to reduce a shine on his temple and for the floor lights to be 
raised in intensity to increase his eye light. CBS personnel and the 
Kennedy advisers looked at Kennedy for about the same amount of 
time-three or four minutes-and made no changes.22 
Although Frances Arvold, a CBS make-up expert who had been 
sent out from New York to make up the candidates, was on hand, 
both refused her services. Because of Nixon's heavy beard, Everett 
Hart, another of his advisers, applied a commercial product, Max Fac-
tor's "Lazy Shave," a pancake cosmetic, to Nixon's face. In the light 
of later reactions to Mr. Nixon's looks, it is interesting to note that 
Barry and Miss Arvold during the program discussed the fact that 
Nixon would have profited from professional make-up services, while 
the candidates' representatives were satisfied with his 100ks.23 Kennedy 
had a rather heavy tan from open-car campaigning in California, and 
his advisers felt he needed no make-up at all. Rogers had recom-
mended Nixon use a sunlamp as far back as August 15, but there is 
no indication that he took the advice. 
There was little discussion of what the candidates would wear; both 
had originally chosen light to medium tone grey suits. Kennedy's 
advisers changed him into a dark blue suit after noting the light set 
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background. Nixon wore the grey suit, as planned. At the last minute, 
the Kennedy people sent back to the hotel for a blue shirt, which he 
changed into after arriving at WBBM-TV.24 
It is clear, both from what he said and the philosophy of his ap-
proach, that Don Hewitt thought of the first debate as a special event. 
He had had thirteen years of experience as a director with CBS, 
including an extensive special event role, much of it under extremely 
difficult conditions. It is interesting to note that Hewitt was named 
producer-director for the first debate, whereas the other networks split 
the job between two or more men. While this is not unusual it did put 
a heavy load on Hewitt. Hewitt said: "I realized that the most impor-
tant function of my job as producer was not to be a producer, in other 
words, not to make a television program out of this. Just to make it 
possible for the people sitting at home to watch the significant event, 
probably the most significant event they had ever watched, and to 
fight the temptation to turn it into a show. I would have preferred an 
audience, that this debate take place in Madison Square Garden, and 
that we cover it as a special event, not as a television show."25 
Hewitt even extended this audience feeling to the press panel. They 
were seated with their backs to the camera, "they were sort of the front 
row. The [home] audience was sitting back behind the cameras, and 
the reporters were sort of asking questions that the audience would 
have asked had they been there."26 In the shots that he took, Hewitt 
was also trying to shorten the distance between the candidates and the 
home viewers-"I tried to have the cameras react more or less like 
Joe Average Citizen would have reacted if he had been able to sit there 
rather than have it fed to him on a coaxial cable." 
Because the candidates were placed so far apart on the platform, 
Hewitt was unable to get a shot including both candidates other than 
the wide "cover" shot used at the beginning and the end. Later direc-
tors, using more cameras, solved this problem with set designs which 
gave more protection on the sides. A major factor in Hewitt's difficulty 
in getting "two-shots"* was a technical decision, that only fixed focal 
length lenses would be used on the studio cameras. Hewitt had re-
quested "zoom lenses" for his main cameras. The CBS technicians, 
however, believed that the fixed focal length lenses would provide a 
"sharper" picture, and overruled Hewitt's request. So the main cameras 
were equipped with lenses of 17 and 15 inch and 135 and 90 milli-
* A one-shot shows one person; a two-shot shows two persons. 
Photo courteB'/l of NBC 
Kennedy becomes a lighting expert: During the pre-program lighting check on the second 
debate, Senator Kennedy objected to the number of lights on him, compared to the number 
on Vice President Nixon. Scratching his head on the extreme left is debate moderator Frank 
McGee. 
Second debate action: Viewed over the heads of the press panel, Vice President Nixon waits 
for a question from the reporters. The camera taking the picture of the reporters is visible 
through the open porthole in the set wall (an innovation in the production of the second 
debate) just above and to the left of Nixon. 
Photo courteB'/l of NBC 
• 
Photo courtesy of ABC 
The two third debates: (above) The Lincoln-Cherney debate. Dan Lincoln, left, the 
stand-in for Vice President Nixon during the third debate pre-program lighting and 
camera checkout eyes Richard Cherney, Senator Kennedy's stand-in. The men are 
3,000 miles apart, but here united on one TV screen. (below) The real debaters 
as they appeared on the air, Vice President Nixon in Los Angeles, and Senator 
Kennedy in New York. (photographed from TV screen) 
Photo courtesy of ABC 
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meter focal lengths. The two center cameras used mostly the 90 mm. 
shot, the two main cameras on either side used the longer lenses for 
the close-ups of the candidates.27 
Hewitt positioned his two main cameras at either end of the press 
panel, so that each candidate would be facing toward the other when 
they talked to the cameras. The other two cameras were placed behind 
the press panel, and took shots which included the reporters and the 
candidates. The lack of an easily obtainable "two-shot" forced Hewitt 
to take a "one-shot reaction shot."* This caused great concern to the 
candidates' representatives, and may have been at least partially re-
sponsible for the public reaction to Nixon's looks which developed 
after the first debate. The question of whether or not to use a reaction 
shot had been discussed extensively before the broadcast. Hewitt 
argued in this way: "I tried to put myself in the position of the viewer, 
and there were certain times when if the guy at home had been in the 
studio, I'm sure he would have looked over to see what Kennedy's 
reaction was to what Nixon was saying, and vice versa ... I made no 
conscious effort to balance, I just called them as I saw them."28 
Nixon's chief production adviser, Ted Rogers, had objected stren-
uously to any plans of using one-shot reaction shots. His objections 
were based on two things. First, his recognition that "Nixon's physical 
image on television was critical." Second, that one-shot reaction shots 
took the audience's attention away from what was being said.29 It is 
apparent that Rogers and Hewitt argued a long time over the one-shot 
reaction shot. Hewitt finally took the question to Dr. Stanton and 
Mickels.on for a decision. They supported Hewitt, and told him to 
shoot the show as he saw it. Kennedy's advisers favored reaction shots 
of any kind. 
In effect, the argument continued even during the broadcast. Al-
though the networks had agreed that each candidate could have two 
representatives in the control room during the broadcast, Hewitt had 
made clear that they would not be allowed to talk to him while the pro-
gram was on the air. However, during the program Bill Wilson, in what 
Hewitt says was "a kidding manner," told Hewitt he owed Kennedy 
more reaction shots. As Hewitt described the conversation, he replied: 
"What do you mean, I've cut away from Kennedy more than I've cut 
away from Nixon ... he [Wilson] said that's what I mean, we like 
"A reaction shot shows one person's reaction when another person is 
speaking. 
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it when you cut away from Kennedy and show Nixon's reaction." 
Wilson said, "Reaction shots are one of my loves; we were there to use 
TV as a medium; I felt we ought to do it as well as possible."30 
The Nixon camp had three more requests, two concerning shots and 
one concerning the camera tally lights. Rogers had asked that Hewitt 
avoid all left profile shots of the Vice President. As it happened, no 
profile shots were used anyway. And, shortly before air time, Nixon 
himself asked that Hewitt avoid taking a reaction shot while he was 
wiping perspiration from his face. Although Hewitt assured Nixon he 
would honor the request, one such action did appear on the program. 
It came, on a wide shot, when Nixon wiped his face with his 
handkerchief while waitirig for a panelist to finish a question. Although 
Hewitt had planned to have the tally lights turned off, he left them on 
at the request of Nixon's advisers. 
The timing of the program was given considerable attention. Robert 
Hammer, of the CBS engineering department, had designed and built 
special cueing devices. These were similar in size to a teleprompter, 
and were mounted on top of the cameras. Using a system of colored 
lights and numbers, these boxe~ warned the candidates when they had 
one minute, thirty seconds, and no time left. The cue-boxes were con-
trolled by CBS News President Sig Mickelson, who kept electric timers 
on the candidates and saw to it that the warning lights were turned 
on in proper sequence. In addition, a stage manager was located in 
the studio with sets of cue-cards, which could have been used in case 
the cue-boxes failed to work. The same cueing instruments were used 
throughout the debates. Mickelson was in the studio, and there was 
only one hitch in the plan. There was no way to tell moderator Smith 
how much time was left, and Mickelson shouted it to him when Smith 
asked for time, which may have been the only unplanned moment in 
the entire four debates as far as the networks were concerned. 
Howard K. Smith, the moderator, was to serve as program guide. 
He had to set the scene for the audience including the reading of the 
all-important "ground rules," to introduce and acknowledge the press 
panel and to provide directions where necessary. He kept the order 
of questioning straight-an order which was agreed upon, and he was 
prepared to interrupt the proceedings to assure equal time to both 
candidates. He went outside the simple task of announcing the order 
twice: first, motioning to Senator Kennedy to stand and walk to his 
rostrum for the first question from the panel; second, calling for the 
amount of time left. Smith, Hewitt, and the panel had met earlier in 
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the day to affirm the order of questions, but, of course, not the content 
of the questions.3 ! 
Obviously, the head-on meeting of the two presidential candidates 
attracted attention. Hundreds of reporters for all media were present 
to watch and report on the program itself, what the candidates said, 
and to interpret, analyze, and record the event both as a political mile-
stone and as a moment in history. Then too, the networks-because 
this was the first joint venture-had their highest executives on hand 
to greet the candidates; technicians were numerous both for the broad-
cast itself and for the communications necessities of the press. Caterers 
were brought in to serve the press, crew, and VIP's. And the candi-
dates had their own entourage, including guests. WBBM originally 
planned to use its Studio 4 to accommodate the reporters, installing 
TV monitors, telephone and teletype circuits and instruments, running 
transcript facilities, and food service. So many reporters asked for 
accreditation (200 reporters had been expected, and 380 turned up), 
that another studio of the same size was opened and identical facilities 
provided. 
It would not be a wild estimate to say that between 600 and 800 
people were in the building when the program went on the air. CBS 
assigned specialists from its press information department to work 
with the Chicago police and the Secret Service in handling traffic and 
security problems. The WBBM building was divided up into six dif-
ferent zones; badges admitting people to the various zones on the basis 
of their needs were struck off. The hottest zone-the "red" area-
was in the studio, the control room, and the office area assigned to the 
two candidates. Only those people who were directly connected with 
the broadcast were allowed in this area, i.e., the candidates and their 
advisers. Reporters and photographers covering the event were not 
allowed in the studio during the broadcast, with the exception of a 
small special press and still photo pool group. Three reporters, two 
for the wire services and one for the magazines, and five photographers 
were permitted in the studio during the broadcast, but were restricted 
to a specially marked area.32 The rest of the press group viewed the 
program from the other studios over a battery of TV monitors. A large 
group of photographers were permitted in the studio prior to air time, 
to photograph the candidates on the set. 
The VIP's, after greeting the candidates, went to the executive office 
suite and watched the program from there, except for NBC Board 
Chairman Robert Sarnoff and CBS Chairman William Paley, who 
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stood in the back of the control room for part of the broadcast. They 
had no active part in the broadcast itself. Dr. Stanton also went into 
the control room for a time, and was observed taking pictures with his 
own miniature camera. There was nothing remarkable about the top 
executives being there; after all, it was "opening night," and a signally 
important one for the broadcasting industry.33 
WBBM-TV technical personnel, supplemented by CBS technicians 
and supervisors from New York, handled the electronic problems with 
special care. Technically it was not a complicated program to produce. 
No special equipment was needed, and while a four-camera, two 
mike-boom program was a full effort for WBBM-TV, station personnel 
had presented many programs with more technical complications. 
Great care was taken in selecting the equipment used. The image 
orthicon tubes were specially chosen from stock. The candidates' voices 
were picked up from RCA "BK-5" microphones mounted on standard 
booms, and an identical microphone and boom were set up in the 
studio on standby. The panel of reporters and Smith wore "lavalier" 
microphones. In addition to the full crews assigned, many other tech-
nicians were present in case of an emergency. As a precautionary 
measure, AT&T had long-lines service personnel in the building. 
During the day of the debate, the technicians had spent a lot of time 
"balancing" the four cameras so that all had the same picture quality. 
The lenses were stopped down to between f 11 and f 16, which is a 
slightly smaller lens setting than WBBM normally uses.34 With all 
cameras balanced technically, video control operator Joe Grisanti 
thought the addition of the floor lights for Mr. Nixon tended to change 
the quality of pictures of the Vice President. Grisanti told the authors, 
"This was done at the expense of the grey scale; consequently, we had 
no blacks in the picture. We tried to compensate by dropping the black 
level, the average level of the picture down; so that we were in effect 
clipping part of the lower grey scale in trying to bring out some contrast 
in the picture." The Kennedy picture, therefore, by technical assess-
ment, had a better grey scale, or in lay terms, more contrast. 
It is interesting to note that because of, or despite, the extreme care 
taken about production details, they became front-page news after the 
first debate. Perhaps for the first time in television history professional 
information such as the make-up worn by a performer and the number 
of lights used on a television program were matters of public discus-
sion. Much, if not all, of the general reaction in the press dealt with 
Nixon's appearance and the visual impact of the program. Reporters 
Plwto courtesy of ABC 
The production rivals: William Wilson, left, Kennedy's TV production adviser, and 
Ted Rogers, right, Nixon's TV man, in a conference before the fourth debate. Shown 
on top of the TV camera is one of the time-warning devices placed on all the 
cameras during all the debates. 
Not all the pictures were on TV: A part of the photo corps which was allowed into 
the studio before the start of the third debate. Vice President Nixon, right, and 
Senator Kennedy posed for the pictures before the debates because only a few pool 
photographers were allowed in the studios during the broadcasts. 
Photo courteB1/ of ABC 
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continually mentioned that Nixon looked "tired, drawn and that he 
appeared to be ill." One Republican leader said Nixon must have 
been made up by people with Democratic leanings, and then the storm 
broke over CBS' head. The Chicago Daily News put reporter Richard 
Stoud onto the story of Nixon's appearance, and Stoud found John 
Hall, business agent of the Make-up Artists and Hair Stylists of Amer-
ica New York local willing to say the make-up job was very bad and 
could not have been the work of a professional make-up artist or union 
member. The Stoud story was headlined "Was Nixon Sabotaged by 
TV Make-up Artists?" and was widely reprinted. CBS received the 
brunt of the reaction, but its defense was undeniable: no CBS person 
had anything to do with Nixon's make-up-as the authors have already 
detailed-and subsequently, the Daily News clarified its story with 
quotes from press secretary Herb Klein that Nixon's make-up had been 
applied by one of his advisers.35 For a day or two everyone was also 
a lighting expert, and Klein even blamed the TV cameras for Nixon's 
looks. 
The fact is that Nixon was not feeling well the day of the first debate; 
he had appeared before a hostile union audience in Chicago that morn- ., 
ing, and had been running a temperature most of the day. He had lost 
weight during his convalescence from a knee operation early in Sep-
tember, and had been campaigning hard. To quote Ted Rogers, "No 
TV camera, no make-up man can hide bone weariness, physical 
fatigue. He was actually sick, he had a fever. Because Nixon did not 
give viewers the expected performance ... deliver ... the predeter-
mined mental picture of what they expected, they looked around to 
find out what was the matter ... he was not the 'fighting commando' 
of the Republican cause. So for the first time, they were more conscious 
of his appearance than of what he was saying."36 
Probably professional make-up services would have helped. Nixon's 
appearance was especially critical on reaction shots. He looked to 
many, including the authors, to be uncomfortable, unsure of himself. 
In reaction shots Nixon's eyes darted around, perspiration was clearly 
noticeable on his chin, and with the tight shots used by Hewitt these 
things were more obvious. 
Kennedy's advisers had rested and briefed him during the day, and 
had avoided all public commitments with the exception of a brief 
appearance before the same union audience that Nixon had addressed 
earlier. Kennedy came through on the broadcast as a strong, self-
assured personality. In the reaction shots Kennedy was seen looking 
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at Nixon with an intense concentration, a look which gave the attitude, 
again to the authors, of command and comfort in the situation. 
First Debate: Program Analysis 
OPENING: Wide shot including moderator Howard K. Smith; Vice 
President Nixon seated right, Senator Kennedy left. Smith con-
tinuity establishes program, introduces Nixon and Kennedy on 
extreme close-up. At 00: 20 Smith in the same opening wide shot 
reads rules, introduces Kennedy for opening statement; Kennedy 
rises and walks to rostrum; cut to close-up of Kennedy. 
SHOTS: Candidates: Earliest shots are tight, barely including necktie 
knot; later shot selection includes chest or "top-button-of-the-coat" 
and one including lectern shelf and supporting stand. 
Newsmen: Following opening statements reporters are introduced 
as they swivel their chairs around to acknowledge the camera; 
shot revealing candidates set in background. During questions shot 
is over the head and shoulders of the newsmen with the candidate 
listening in the background. The attention focused on the candidate. 
Reactions: All reaction shots are one-shots of the candidate who is 
not speaking. There are 11 of Kennedy for a total of 118 seconds, 
and 9 of Nixon for a total of 85 seconds. First reaction shot at 
07:02, during Kennedy's opening statement. The next at 10:35, 
during Nixon's opening statement, and there are two other reaction 
shots of Kennedy during Nixon's opening statement. 
CLOSING: From one-shot of the last speaker, Kennedy, to one-shot 
of Smith, and on the cue: "Good night from Chicago," cut to wide 
shot over the panel, which pulls back to an even wider shot show-
ing all four newsmen, the complete set and studio personnel and 
equipment. Over this shot, two graphics, containing identification 
of the three television networks, are superimposed. 
COMMENT: Hewitt was free-wheeling in his approach and execution; 
reaction shots were numerous and paced with the content; addi-
tional candidate reactions were gained with shots of the candidates 
listening to the newsmen. Audio was without flaw. 
HEAT, LIGHT, AND NERVES 
Second Debate 
Date: October 7, 1960, 7:30 EDST, NBC 
Place: Studio A, WRC-TV, Washington, D. C. 
SELTZ AND YOAKAM, 
Producer: Julian Goodman, Vice President, News, NBC, New York 
Director: Frank Slingland, NBC, Washington 
Designer: Hjalmar Hermanson, NBC, N(}w York 
Lighting: Leon Chromak, NBC, Washington 
Makeup: Bob O'Bradovich, NBC, New York 
Timers: Elmer Lower, News Director, NBC, Washington; Russ 
Tornabene, News Supervisor, NBC, Washington 
Technical Supervisors: William H. Trevarthen, NBC, New York; 
John Rogers, NBC, Washington 
Moderator: Frank McGee, NBC 
Panel: Edward p, Morgan, ABC; Paul Nivin, CBS; Alvin Spivak, 
UPI; Hal Levy, Newsday 
Format: News panel, unlimited to subject matter, no formal state-
ments; 2;.2 minutes to answer questions; 1;.2 minutes for rebuttal 
comment by other candidate 
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If there was tension bred of newness and unfamiliarity during the 
first debate in Chicago, it is probable that there was even more tension 
before the second because of the sensitivity of the candidates to the 
effects of the first debate on the voters and politicians. NBC drew the 
responsibility for production of the second debate, and key NBC per-
sonnel had observed the production of the first debate, NBC was 
determined to iron out the wrinkles that developed at Chicago, In two 
memoranda from NBC President Robert E. Kintner to William Mc-
Andrew, Executive Vice President, NBC News, the policy lines were 
carefully delineated, McAndrew was given complete authority for the 
production of the program, but he was instructed to yield to the candi-
dates and their representatives on questions of lighting and make-up 
after first making the network's agreement or disagreement clear. Mc-
Andrew was advised not to yield to any persuasion concerning changes 
in the set unless his producer and director agreed. 
The question of a change in the site for the second debate arose 
shortly after Howard K. Smith signed off the first debate on September 
26. After the first debate, Julian Goodman and Frank Slingland, who 
had been assigned the roles of producer and director respectively for 
the second debate, went from Chicago to Cleveland and met with John 
Rogers of the NBC technical staff, Rod Clurman, Goodman's ad-
ministrative assistant, and Hjalmar Hermanson, NBC set designer, in 
order to form a survey team to study the production problems a 
Cleveland origination might pose. Also involved in the Cleveland sur-
vey were Leonard Reinsch, the Democrats' TV coordinator, William 
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Wilson, in charge of Kennedy's TV appearances, and Edward Rogers, 
the Republicans' TV man. . 
Both practical and political problems were involved in the Cleve-
land site. It was first planned that this debate would be in New York, 
but campaign schedules dictated a change. The Republicans felt that 
since they had accommodated the Democrats on the site of the first 
debate, and since it was easiest for the Vice President to meet Kennedy 
next in a Midwestern city, the Democrats should accommodate them 
by accepting the Cleveland site.37 This was accomplished without much 
argument in the early stages of planning. But the overriding problems 
at Cleveland were those of space. The NBC affiliate, KYW-TV, has 
adequate facilities for its own productions, but the main studio where 
it was proposed that the debate take place was considered small by the 
survey team.3S The major difficulty with the facilities was the lack of 
space to handle the nonparticipants-the press and VIP's who would 
come to cover the debate. We saw that in Chicago CBS had planned 
for 200 reporters and 380 attended. The survey team believed that 
setting up the facilities for at least as many as there were in Chicago 
would have been impossible at KYW. Since there were compelling 
reasons, however, for holding the debate in Cleveland, the survey team, 
with the cooperation of Cleveland civic authorities, tried to find a 
proper place. One network official called it; "the battle of the hors 
d'oeuvres ... it was a question of who had the best hors d'oeuvres 
for the press .... " 
Working steadily for the better part of two days, the teams examined 
hotel ballrooms, an industrial plant, and a university assembly hall. In 
many instances they found adequate space and comfort, or people will-
ing to make changes by removing chandeliers from a ballroom, knock-
ing out walls at the TV studio, adding sound baffling material, and 
adding air conditioning equipment; but a main objection was that the 
program would have to be a remote broadcast if it originated in the 
facilities offered by Cleveland. The fears of adding the problems inher-
ent in a remote broadcast to the already serious production problems 
were very large and real at the time. The best facility was at one of the 
hotels, but its main ballroom fronted on a busy Cleveland thor-
oughfare and Slingland worried that the sound of a siren on some 
passing emergency vehicle might leak through the walls during the 
debate. For these reasons, the NBC group left Cleveland on Wednes-
day, September 28, with the recommendation that the debate be moved 
to the NBC studios in Washington.3o Nixon apparently agreed to the 
Photo courtesy of ABC 
Home away from ~ome: The inside and outside of one of the cottages ABC 
constructed for the candidates in their New York studio. Decoration and 
painting were carried out completely. The interior shows even the pictures 
on the wall were originals; the fact that the pictures were not identical was 
commented on by several reporters during a preview. 
Photo courtesy of ABC 
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switch, but didn't or couldn't communicate with adviser Fred Scribner, 
who was campaigning. The NBC production team had to talk Scribner 
into moving, and finally he "reluctantly" agreed.40 Kennedy's advisers 
agreed quickly. 
Station WRC-TV in Washington, where the second debate was 
to be staged, is a spacious, modern installation, equipped for color 
in addition to black and white production. A large scenic storage 
area was particularly important here, because it could be cleared and 
used to house the reporters, as the adjoining studios were used at 
WBBM-TV in Chicago. The new facility also included a complete and 
modern set of executive offices, so that adequate accommodations for 
the candidates and their parties were easily arranged, close to the 
studio. 
Hjalmar Hermanson had participated in the discussions about the 
set design in Cleveland, at first based on the probable origination from 
that city, and finished his planning by Friday, September 30. These 
discussions were influenced by the opinions of NBC personnel and the 
candidates' representatives, who felt that CBS had oversimplified the 
set for the first debate. The candidates' representatives in concert with 
Hermanson felt that the set should be "warmer" with more texture in 
the flats and furniture, that the furnishings should be more solid as 
contrasted with the spindly quality of the Chicago set, and that the 
candidates' legs should be masked by desks when they were seated 
and by some sort of rostrum when they stood. Producer Julian Good-
man felt that the rostrums should be more substantial, so that the can-
didates could lean on them while talking; again a contrast from the 
Chicago set, in which the rostrums were little more than severely 
designed music stands. The approach was obviously different from that 
of the CBS designers, who had designed and executed a "modern" set; 
the NBC set, for veteran performers such as the candidates, was more 
in keeping with what they had used before, and was designed to be 
more "comfortable." NBC wanted a backdrop which would be a bit 
darker and less reflective than the CBS set; with this change they 
hoped to avoid the extensive background changes that had been neces-
sary in Chicago. To achieve these goals Hermanson designed a center 
desk with canted wings and podia which were kidney-shaped to pro-
vide a side arm rest with a ledge in front; these were to be covered, as 
was the background, with a medium brown grass cloth.41 
Hermanson and the others involved in the set design, and even the 
candidates' representatives, imagined that the second debate would 
r . 
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be more like the NBC "Meet the Press" program than the first debate 
had been. The choice of Slingland as director seems to have been made 
on the basis of his four to five years' experience as director of "Meet 
the Press."42 Most of the production details were carried out with this 
concept in mind. In fact, during the earliest discussions about the 
format, as we have seen, some of the candidates' representatives 
actually referred to the second debate as a "Meet the Press-type 
program. "43 
Therefore, the area for the reporters' panel was also handled dif-
ferently. The background behind the candidates was composed of 29 
grass-cloth covered panels 2Y2 by 10 feet set up in a semi-circle 
of slightly more than 180 degrees. The reporters were positioned be-
hind a gently curved desk approximately 10 feet long. Behind the 
reporters Hermanson designed a low wall, 53 inches high, to provide 
a background for camera shots of the reporters when they asked ques-
tions. On the first debate there had been no full-face shots of the 
reporters except as they were introduced, and the NBC concept of a 
"Meet the Press" program called for seeing the reporters as they asked 
their questions. A porthole was built into the center of the large back-
ground behind the candidates, approximately eight feet up on the wall, 
so that a camera could be positioned to shoot directly into the press 
panel. The entire candidates' set was placed on a one-foot-high kidney-
shaped riser which was covered with a rug. Because of the shortage of 
time, Hermanson did not make working drawings of the set or furni-
ture, but did construct a model set of balsa wood and cardboard which 
he took to a meeting with the candidates' representatives, Wilson and 
Rogers, in Washington, Monday, October 2. It was indeed fortunate 
that they approved the set, since its construction in New York was 
almost completed. Most of this production meeting was involved with 
discussion of "shooting" angles, one of which the NBC people kept 
secret until shortly before air time the following Friday.44 
Hermanson's set was trucked to the WRC studios Wednesday, Octo-
ber 4. That evening Hermanson personally supervised the setup. One 
additional variation he had included was to design the candidates' and 
moderator's desk so that it could be taken apart into three units, and 
provide a feeling of separation, if desired. The candidates' represen-
tatives looked at the set, viewed it on camera late Wednesday evening, 
and all agreed it had come off exactly as they had planned.45 With the 
set in place and approved, Leon Chromak, an NBC technical director 
on the Washington staff, who had twelve years of experience with many 
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of the political programs NBC originates from there, was brought in 
to light it. 
The WRC-TV studio, despite its recent design, did not have dim-
mers included in its lighting control setup. Chromak, realizing the im-
portance of the lighting, particularly the need for fine control of inten-
sity, had six dimmers shipped in from New York. He took special 
precautions with his lighting plan. Contrary to the usual practice of 
suspending most lighting instruments from an overhead grid, Chromak 
mounted his key lights on floor stands so that he could make vertical 
and horizontal angle adjustments without the necessity of moving in 
ladders. On Thursday, Chromak "roughed in" his lights, set up spare 
instruments (using two assistants) beside the main light sources to 
protect against the failure of anyone lamp, and set his over-all front 
light level at about 140 foot candles.46 
Chromak said he lit for a modeling effect, with the key light a little 
to the left of center, fill light basically from the right, some low light 
coming into the eyes, and with set light and back light to finish it off. 
He said he had lit both Kennedy and Nixon many times before, and 
was familiar with their particular needs. He had, of course, talked with 
Slingland and accommodated all of the angles the director was going 
to use in shooting. By Thursday night, Chromak said, "I was 98 per 
cent ready, a little trim here and there, but even if I didn't trim I 
thought I was ready."47 
But for the second time lighting changes started to become a part 
of the debate story. Wilson, Kennedy's TV adviser, saw the final light 
setup late Thursday evening, and told Goodman he wanted "blander 
lighting for Kennedy." Chromak and Goodman acceded to Wilson's 
request by adding scoop lights to fill in and give a more diffuse effect. 
Imero Fiorentino, formerly an ABC lighting director who had been 
hired as a lighting consultant for Nixon after the Chicago uproar, also 
viewed the light setup at about the same time and approved it. Al-
though Wilson's request had added more lights to the Kennedy side 
of the set, Chromak told the authors he did not feel his light plan had 
been basically changed. 
About 6: 30 P.M. Friday, Kennedy arrived in the studio for the pre-
show check, preceding Nixon by previous agreement. He was accom-
panied by Leonard Reinsch, his brother Robert, and Wilson. Shortly 
after Kennedy reached his place on the set, he walked over to the 
Nixon podium, then back again, and asked why there were more lights 
on his part of the set than on Nixon's. Robert Kennedy, standing in 
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Nixon's place, complained contrarily that there were more lights on 
Nixon's set. Both made several trips to the control room to view each 
other in the Kennedy portion of the set, carrying on a running discus-
sion of the light with their advisers, demanding lighting changes replete 
with such comments as "did 'they' arrange our lights toO?"48 Chromak 
agreed to move one of the floor stand lights, and adjust the intensity 
of some of the other lights. Today he refers to it as a "psychological 
lighting change."49 Whether it was a serious matter for the Senator, or 
whether he was just practicing "upmanship" as has been suggested by 
at least one of his advisers, will never be known, but again the candi-
date got what he wanted in what otherwise would have been a strictly 
routine lighting assignment. 50 
Kennedy forces, however, still were not satisfied with the conditions 
and raised a question about the temperature of the studio. No accurate 
record of the exact temperature of the studio was kept. Kennedy par-
tisans say it was down to 64 degrees, and Kennedy himself commented, 
"I need a sweater."51 In any case, the proper functionary was sum-
moned, the studio thermostat raised, and everyone agrees that it 
warmed up during the program, whether from the words spoken, the 
TV lights, or the relief of the tension, no one will ever be sure. Nixon, 
in contrast to the first debate lighting squabble, agreed that Chromak's 
lighting was satisfactory for him, although his advisers recommended 
a slight raise in the intensity of the key light and back light, which was 
quickly done. The Kennedy party, with its nervous pacing, took about 
thirty minutes to get satisfaction; Nixon's few changes were accom-
plished in five minutes. 
NBC, like CBS in Chicago, had brought in one of their top make-up 
men, Bob O'Bradovich, calling him down from a location job at Har-
pers Ferry, Virginia, to be on hand if needed. After the bitter argu-
ment over make-up in Chicago, Nixon had hired a professional, Stan 
Lawrence, to handle the job for the rest of the debates. Kennedy never 
used make-up; so O'Bradovich had nothing to do. Nixon wore a darker 
suit this time. Kennedy's was about the same shade as the one he wore 
in Chicago. 
Frank Slingland, who had been an observer at Chicago, had the 
"Meet the Press" idea uppermost in his mind. Slingland ordered six 
cameras, dollies, booms, and other standard equipment. The only spe-
cial consideration was having equipment which would lift the cameras 
high enough to shoot over the top of the low wall behind the reporters, 
and over the heads of the reporters themselves. The two main cameras 
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-those that would shoot the full-face shots of the candidates-were 
equipped with identical lens complements of 135 mm, 10 inch, 12 
inch, and 17 inches. The camera located high and in back of the 
candidates was fitted with a six to one zoom lens.52 The remaining 
three cameras had what would be considered a normal complement 
of lenses for a regular studio program. The longer lenses were dictated 
by the size of the set and Slingland's desire to take close-ups without 
having to move the cameras too close. A 35 mm lens was included in 
one of the camera complements, and it was used only twice for the 
wide opening and closing shots of the program. 
Originally Slingland had planned to use the six to one zoom lenses 
on the main cameras. During one of the early production conferences 
the candidates' representatives raised a question about the sharpness 
of the zoom lenses. NBC's John Rogers said he felt that zoom lenses 
are a little "softer" than standard lenses, and so standard lenses of 
fixed focal length, similar to the complements used in Chicago, were 
agreed upon for the candidates. 53 
The innovation of Hermanson's design and Slingland's planning was 
the two-shot reaction shot. Slingland had told Goodman that he 
planned to use this shot, but had not shown it to anyone. He said: 
"This was something that Hjalmar and I had talked about and not 
looked at, because if we had looked at it, there would have been great 
discussion on both sides. "54 He rehearsed during the afternoon without 
using the shot, but about 5: 45 P.M., one hour and forty-five minutes 
before the program went on the air, Slingland called up the combina-
tion reaction shots and showed them to Wilson and Rogers. When 
they were satisfied as to equal size and angle, both advisers ap-
proved use of these new shots. Again, unlike Chicago, where Hewitt 
used tight shots from very near the beginning of the program, Slingland 
saw his own early shot pattern as a series of pictures always moving 
closer to the candidates; but he refrained from using the special com-
bination reaction shot until fifteen to twenty minutes into the program 
in order to add variety as the program developed. However, the Ken-
nedy representatives in the control room, Reinsch and Wilson, began 
to ask for Slingland's combination reaction shot shortly after the pro-
gram went on the air. As Slingland puts it, "I did feel breathing on the 
back of my neck, I think it was Reinsch."55 
The Kennedy forces' first demand for more reaction shots-which 
they felt benefited Kennedy more than Nixon-was relayed to Sling-
land by the producer, Goodman, and Slingland turned it down. He 
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said he was trying to let the content of the program motivate all his 
shots and didn't feel that the reaction shots were called for yet. But 
Reinsch and Wilson kept up their demands and their second request 
was granted. 
The reaction shots led to another unusual action by Slingland. He 
kept a stop watch in his hand, and each time he took a reaction shot 
he timed its length on the air. He may have been under the impression, 
because of the discussion going on behind him, that the candidates' 
representatives were keeping track of the number and length of the 
shots. In the final analysis, Slingland's cutting point was dictated by 
the content, but he did take unusual care to provide "equal time." 
Otherwise, the timing on the program was controlled by Elmer Lower 
and Russ Tornabene from a post outside the studio, using the same 
cueing equipment as in Chicago.56 
McGee, as moderator, explained the ground rules, introduced the 
news panel, and then provided transitions between questions and an-
swers for the rest of the program. The order in which the reporters 
would ask questions had been agreed upon in advance. It was designed 
to provide for an equal number of questions for each candidate from 
each reporter, and to prevent anyone reporter from questioning only 
one of the candidates. It was a simple 1, 2, 3, 4,-2, 3, 4, 1, etc., 
rotation, and McGee was in charge of seeing that it was carried out. 
There was no limitation on subject matter and the reporters gave no 
warning to the candidates in advance. 
Again the responsibility and the desire to do the best possible job 
were felt by the technical people as well as by the NBC production 
staff. Six carefully chosen image orthicon tubes for the cameras were 
sent from New York, and the camera and tube combinations for all 
of the cameras at WRC-TV were tested until the best six were found. 
Care was also taken, while Slingland was matching his shots, to check 
the optical capabilities of the camera lenses, and in one instance a lens 
was changed. The eye level of each candidate was measured to within 
one-quarter of an inch and the cameras adjusted accordingly. The 
audio setup for the broadcast was carefully protected, with duplicate 
microphones for the candidates, and spare but "ready" microphones 
for the moderator and reporters in addition to those they used. 
The program was fed to New York and from New York was fed 
to all radio and television networks. NBC used a special line to feed 
the program to New York, and backed this up with its regular round-
robin lines. 57 With all the extra care, there was only one little hitch, 
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and although it came at a heart-stopping time, it had no effect on the 
air program. 
Ten minutes before air time, a circuit breaker, overloaded because 
two extra cameras were being used, broke contact, as it should. This 
cut off the power to two of the camera monitors in the control room. 
NBC technicians found the breaker, reset it, and then ran another line 
into the control room to provide more power. The program went on 
the air with technician John Platt holding a plug into a socket until 
the new line was installed minutes later. Slingland was prepared to 
view the two monitors "around" Platt, and went on the air shouting, 
"Move over, Johnny, we're going to take that camera now!"58 
The production efforts of NBC to achieve a "warmer and more 
comfortable" set were recognized by the public. Although they did 
nothing radically different, the lighting and make-up men were cred-
ited with "doing a better job." But there were still comments about 
Nixon's "stiffness," especially on the reaction shots. When answering 
he seldom looked at the people who asked him questions, and on the 
two-shot reaction shots-seen in this debate for the first time-he was 
often caught staring into the studio rather than looking at Kennedy. 
A rising tide of comment also developed from the format. Arthur 
Krock commented: "The panel form prevents the debate from realizing 
the incisiveness that occurs only when candidates ask questions of 
each other .... "59 
The argument over lighting and air conditioning during the pre-
show checkout was widely reported in newspapers and magazines. 
However, its total effect on the production, the authors feel, was nil. 
The emphasis was shifting from the production aspects of the program 
to the content of the candidates' messages. 
Second Debate: Program Analysis 
OPENING: On moderator Frank McGee in one-shot, including top of 
desk, at 00: 30 pulls back to three-shot to include seated candidates 
at desk wings. Cut to long shot including backs of panel, rostrums, 
flags, and carafe tables, as McGee opening continuity continues. 
Cut to close-up of Nixon, then Kennedy, as they are introduced 
by name. Cut to McGee, who introduces panel as they are panned 
at table top level. Cut back to first newsman, Paul Nivin, for 
question to the Vice President. 
SHOTS: Candidates: Shots start wide, including top of lectern, moving 
in to a mid-chest and then shoulder-level shot. In each sequence 
of question-answer-comment, shots are identical in size and angle. 
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Newsmen: Porthole in center of candidates' background permits 
head-on shots of the newsman. These are mostly a loose table-top 
shot, including name card of newsman. 
Reactions: Both one-shot and two-shot reactions are taken. There 
are eight reactions of each, and in each case, the eight total exactly 
1 :42. There are five two-shots, and three one-shots in each case, 
the two-shots always with the spea~er in the foreground. The 
first is of Nixon, a two-shot at 17: 11. The first of Kennedy, also 
a two-shot, is taken at 18: 24. 
CLOSING: Cut from last speaker to a one-shot of McGee, which dis-
solves to a wide shot behind and above the panel. As this shot pulls 
back the lights on the panel area are turned off and the network 
identification graphics are superimposed across the lower portion 
of the screen. 
COMMENT: Slingland's approach was systematic, with definite pat-
terns in the shot sequences. He shot off the set, in the two-shot 
reactions, into a studio area which had been draped to cover this 
possibility. Later in the program he cut away from the newsmen 
to catch candidate reactions to the questions asked. Slingland's 
tightest shot was looser than Hewitt's. Audio was without flaw. 
SEPARATE BUT EQUAL 
Third Debate 
Date: October 13, .J960, 7:30 EDST, ABC 
Place: TV # 1, ABC, New York (Kennedy); Studio A, Studio B, 
ABC, Los Angeles (Nixon and newsmen) 
Producer: Donald Coe, ABC, New York 
Directors: Marshall Diskin, Los Angeles, Controlling Director; Jack 
Sameth, New York 
Designer: George Corrin, ABC, New York 
Lighting: Everett Melosh, ABC, New York 
Make-up: Rudy Horvatich, ABC, Los Angeles; Harry Burkhardt, 
ABC, New York 
Timers: Donald Coe, Los Angeles, Controlling Timer; John Madigan, 
New York 
Technical Supervisors: Robert Trashinger and Merle Woerster, ABC, 
New York 
Production Manager: Fred Schumann, ABC, New York 
Moderator: William Shadel, ABC 
Panel: Roscoe Drummond, New York Herald Tribune; Frank Mc-
Gee, NBC; Charles Von Fremd, CBS; Douglass Cater, The 
Reporter 
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Format: News panel unlimited to subject matter, no formal state-
ments; 2Y2 minutes to answer, 1 Y2 minutes to comment 
Of all the debates, the third was truly the electronic debate. Because 
of different campaign schedules, an agreement was reached that tele-
vision should bring the candidates together electronically. They could 
be on the same screen together even though they were three thousand 
miles apart-Nixon being in Los Angeles, Kennedy in New York. 
They merely had to go to ABC studios in each city, and with the aid 
of an elaborate technical exercise, they met, in ABC's terms, "Face 
to Face. "60 
Donald Coe, ABC director of special events and operations, drew 
the producing assignment shortly after Labor Day. Since they were 
responsible for the third debate ABC held some distinct advantages. 
There was an obvious disadvantage when they were also respon-
sible for the fourth debate, only eight days later.61 ABC profited 
greatly from observing the efforts of CBS and NBC; at least the jitters 
of the premier production had worn off and the smoothing out that 
took place during the second debate contributed to a calmer atmos-
phere. Coe was an observer at each of the two previous debates, and 
set design plans were started even before the second debate in 
Washington. 
The studios for the third debate were at the ABC Production Center 
in New York for Senator Kennedy, and at the Los Angeles ABC West 
Coast Center for Vice President Nixon and the panel of reporters. In 
both locations the. studio facilities are excellent. ABC's New York 
studio TV . # 1 is 75 by 90 feet, one of the largest and certainly one 
of the best equipped television studios in the United States. It has an 
extremely modern lighting system and a control room complete with 
separate facilities for audio and video control and production. In Los 
Angeles two studios were set up--one for Nixon and one for the 
panel of reporters. Control of the program was in Los Angeles because 
more of the production elements were there. Obviously ABC had to 
arrange for twice as much equipment, crews, and production and tech-
nical personnel; as we will see, the concept for the third debate was 
an exact duplication of facilities, even to the most minute detail. 
Set designer George Corrin worked under a general directive to make 
the candidates as comfortable' as possible. This followed a line of 
thought that permeated ABC planning: do everything possible to 
prevent development of the kind of controversies between the candi-
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dates' representatives and the production personnel which were so 
apparent earlier. The set for the third debate was a combination of 
warm-toned gold fabric and wood grained panels for the background, 
a large L-shaped standing desk for a podium-easily the most massive 
and substantial rostrum yet provided-and a floor-to-ceiling built-in 
bookcase unit to the side of the candidate.62 Identical sets were con-
structed at New York and Los Angeles. Kennedy's set was, in a sense, 
the right half of the picture, and he faced in toward the center from 
the right. Nixon's set was the left half of the picture, and he faced in 
toward the center from the left-in both cases this was a conscious 
effort to maintain an east-west relationship between the candidates, 
their actual geographic orientation. 
Set construction itself was not complicated, but an incredible amount 
of effort was expended to be sure that each set, studio, light unit, 
camera, microphone, and transmission element of the broadcast was 
absolutely identical. ABC bought the cloth for the background from 
the same mill run in an amount large enough to cover both sets. All of 
the paint used for both sets was mixed in New York. After the New 
York set had been painted, Fred Schumann, Director of Production 
Services for ABC, carried the same can of paint, by plane, to Los 
Angeles and delivered it personally to the west coast set painters.63 
At Los Angeles, the 80 by 90 foot studio was eqnipped with lighting 
instruments manufactured by the Mole Richardson company. The 
east coast studio had Kliegl Brothers instruments. Adhering to the 
equality dictum, the lighting director ordered the Mole Richardson 
instruments removed and Kliegl instruments, identical with those used 
in New York, installed in their place. An even more sophisticated 
refinement concerned the lamps used in the lighting instruments. The 
west coast bulbs, regardless of their wattage, were rated at a slightly 
higher Kelvin temperature than the bulbs used on the east coast. The 
lighting director ordered the bulbs in the east coast instruments re-
moved and replaced with the higher Kelvin temperature units.64 
The New York ABC Executive Offices would ordinarily have served 
as headquarters for the candidates, but since they are located some 
distance from the studio, the network decided to build a cottage in 
the studio for Senator Kennedy's use as a dressing room. This cottage 
contained a sitting room and office-dressing room, telephones, and a 
lavatory. In Los Angeles, Mr. Nixon used an office suite. The facilities 
on the west coast were more complex, because the panel of newsmen 
was there. Located in another studio building with the moderator, 
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they were seated at a slightly curved desk-table, with a background 
of the same design and texture as that used behind the candidates. 
Facilities for handling the press corps which covered both ends of the 
debate were similar to those for the previous debates. Two hundred 
reporters were accommodated at New York, 160 in Los Angeles.65 
The air conditioning problem was easily solved this time. Nixon's 
representatives had his studio in Los Angeles cooled to between 58 
and 60 degrees, a "refrigeration" that didn't bother Kennedy this time, 
because he wasn't there. 
The real story of the third debate was in the technical problems 
involved in originating simultaneously from both coasts. While this 
procedure was not being done for the first time, the whole television 
industry was really on trial to prove the electronic face-to-face tech-
nique could be brought off without a hitch. ABC felt the pressure. 
They had worked with the AT&T long-lines experts far in advance on 
several highly technical but crucial problems. 
The program was controlled from Los Angeles. The Kennedy half 
of the program was sent from New York to Los Angeles, mixed there 
with the Nixon half of the program, and the combined picture and 
. sound of both candidates were sent back to New York, where they 
were fed to all networks. Electronic signals travel at a very rapid rate, 
but not so rapidly that this double transcontinental relay, complicated 
by the fact that half of the picture and sound traveled 3,000 miles 
further than the other, could have been made without a noticeable 
lag in sound. ABC employed· "carrier signal" facilities to handle the 
problem. Without the special precautions taken, the Kennedy sound 
and picture might not have been synchronized. As it was Kennedy 
lagged 1/38th of a second behind Nixon-a time lapse so short that 
it was not noticeable to the untrained eye.66 
A second problem was that all program participants had to be able 
to hear each other without wearing head-phones. Special circuits and 
loudspeakers were used, and great care was taken in adjusting the 
sound levels to avoid "feedback." Internal communication between 
the coasts was maintained by full period talk circuits, and every major 
production and technical position could talk to its counterpart on the 
opposite coast. Program audio and video lines, all duplicated, were 
under constant surveillance for the better part of three days to insure 
flawless performance.67 
In all, twelve cameras were involved, three times as many as those 
used in Chicago, and twice as many as those in Washington. On the 
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west coast Director Marshall Diskin had six cameras, three each in 
two studios, and a spare camera in each studio patched into a stand-by 
control room. The east coast used four cameras, patched into two 
control rooms, one of which was a standby. All cameras and image 
orthicon tubes were carefully checked. Each candidate's sound was 
taken from duplicate microphones, and fed through a battery pow-
ered console as well as the regular audio control board. Even if power 
had failed, the sound portion of the program would have continued 
without interruption. 
Everett Melosh worked out his light plot with Imerio Fiorentino, 
Nixon's lighting consultant, and Wilson, Kennedy's TV adviser. He 
set up a complete duplication of each lighting instrument to avoid 
bulb failure. Each studio lighting plan was identic~l, down to the 
number, type, and size of instruments. Melosh placed his key lights 
to the right of center, shining downward at a 30-degree angle and his 
general fill and set lights on each side of the set. Every important 
instrument was on a separate dimmer. Each candidate had a floor-
stand spotlight for his eyes. Again the light level was at about 125 
foot candles. 
The only change from Melosh's lighting setup was made twenty 
minutes before the broadcast when the candidates' representatives 
asked for a change in the background levels. The Kennedy forces 
wanted a darker background in New York, and the Nixon people a 
lighter one in Los Angeles; so slight changes in the set lighting were 
made. On the air, there were differences in the background tones. 
Melosh operated the light setup by watching the transcontinental mon-
itor circuit and ordering changes over his private phone line. 68 
All these preparations were aimed at one thing: preventing any 
element of the broadcast from being affected by the 3,OOO-mile separa-
tion. ABC wanted to be certain that it did not have the Monday-
morning quarterbacking that CBS had had. Starting the night before 
the broadcast, and continuing throughout most of the debate day, 
Marshall Diskin in Hollywood and Jack Sameth in New York matched 
the size of the shots, camera by camera, lens by lens, until they were 
identical in size and angle. With painstaking care they also matched 
the "split-screen" shot, so that the halves of the picture were identical. 
And there was a visual debate that was never seen-the "Lincoln-
Cherney debate." Actor Dan Lincoln was hired to stand in for Senator 
Kennedy in New York because he has the same physical characteristics 
and coloring as Kennedy, and in Los Angeles, actor Richard Cherney 
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took the role for Nixon for the same reasons. These two men stood 
in front of the cameras for hours at a time, talking and acting as if 
they were the real debaters. 
The Diskin-Sameth plan for the actual direction of the program put 
Diskin in the driver's seat. He would put up a shot: for example, Nixon 
from the waist up. Sameth would then punch up on the preview circuit 
an identical shot of Kennedy. At the appropriate time Diskin would 
take his shot on the air. In this way, as shot followed shot, they were 
always in pairs. 69 
The hot question of reaction shots was raised again, but the technical 
conditions in this case saved Diskin many arguments. The reaction 
shots had to be one-shots because the candidates were not physically 
together. Diskin said the candidates' representatives talked to him 
about reaction shots during most of the day. Diskin said, "I tried to 
put them together the way I thought it would be most agreeable to 
both." But he took only one reaction shot of Kennedy late in the 
program. It was easier to shoot the newsmen this time; they were in 
the other studio with the moderator and it was a simple task to get 
head-on shots of them in the order previously decided. 
In all, the checking, doubling up of equipment, and great care taken 
with the production and technical details paid off. For although the 
split-screen shot was used only once during the program, in a split 
second it brought the two candidates together and gave the American 
public one of the most memorable pictures of the campaign. Tech-
nically, the broadcast went off without any trouble. 
There was little or no comment about the production after the third 
debate. Visually. Nixon came off the best thus far in the series, primar-
ily, the authors feel, because only one reaction shot was used, and that 
was one of Kennedy. Whenever Nixon was on the air, he was speaking, 
which eliminated the one element of production with which he had 
had the most difficulty. 
There was another internal uproar in this debate, which, while it 
had nothing to do with the production, did involve the whole area of 
the agreements between the candidates on the ground rules. Nixon and 
his group raised a public outcry over Kennedy's use of notes during the 
debate. Before the program went on the air, Kennedy took some papers 
out of his pocket and put them on his rostrum. The ABC director in 
New York, Jack Sameth, saw the papers, and asked his floor director 
to tell Kennedy to put them away because he thought t.hey looked 
messy. The floor director spoke to Kennedy, who seemed to be con-
fused, and so Sameth rescinded the order just before the program went 
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on the air.70 Nixon may have seen Kennedy with his notes over the 
monitor circuit before the program started. And he may have noticed 
that Kennedy looked down to read a quotation during the program. 
Kennedy had three documents with him: a photostat of an Eisenhower 
letter concerning United States treaty agreements in the Taiwan 
Strait; a photostat of a page from a book by General Matthew Ridg-
way; and a quotation from former Secretary of State Dulles.71 Nixon 
was under the impression that there was a rule against the use of notes. 
In his acceptance telegram of July 28 Nixon said, "In general, it is my 
position that joint television appearances of the presidential candidates 
should be conducted as full and free exchange of views without pre-
pared texts or notes, and without interruption .... "72 There is no 
indication that Senator Kennedy accepted or acknowledged this as a 
rule, and Kennedy's aides continued to deny that there was any such 
rule. 
Third Debate: Program Analysis 
OPENING: On moderator Shadel at desk; cut to split-screen shot with 
candidates facing toward the center of the screen; shot includes top 
of lecterns. The words New York and Los Angeles are superim-
posed at the bottom of each frame. Cut to wide shot of panel, 
and to individual shots of newsmen. Shadel introduces first news-
man, McGee, who addresses question to Senator Kennedy in New 
York. 
SHOTS: Candidates: Four different shots are used, always in pairs: 
lectern level, middle-button-of-coat, handkerchief-pocket, and tie 
knot. In each sequence shots are always followed by identical shots, 
and the shot sequences become tighter as the program develops. 
Newsmen: Two different shots, one close-up, the other at desk 
level. All are head-on. 
Reactions: One reaction shot of Kennedy is taken at 47:05, and 
it lasts 20 seconds. 
CLOSING: Cut from last speaker, Nixon, to one-shot of Shadel at desk, 
who explains there is not enough time for another complete se-
quence of questions. Shadel fills from 56:40 to 59:00 with material 
describing equal facilities afforded the candidates in the separate 
cities; cut to cover shot of newsmen with superimposition of net-
work credits. 
COMMENT: Diskin's approach was extremely conservative, but it was 
necessitated somewhat by the technical complexities of coast-to-
coast switching. The split-screen shot functioned perfectly, but it 
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was used only once and then not in the body of the debate. The 
L-shaped rostrum encouraged the candidates to lean on one elbow, 
which resulted in some shots in which their bodies were slightly 
angled. Audio was without flaw. 
THE FINAL ROUND 
Fourth Debate 
Date: October 21, 1960, 10 p.m. EDST, ABC 
Place: TV # 1, ABC, New York 
Moderator: Quincy Howe, ABC 
Panel: John Edwards, ABC; Walter Cronkite, CBS; Frank Singiser, 
MBS; John Chancellor, NBC 
Format: Foreign policy, 8-minute opening statements, questions and 
answers, comment, closing statement 
Note: Since ABC also produced the 3rd debate, the production per-
sonnel were virtually the same. Jack Sameth was a standby 
director. 
The final round of the Great Debates moved into New York. The 
networks had drawn for the order of the first three debates on the basis 
that each would do one, and then they drew for the fourth to see who 
would do the odd one. ABC, which brought off the trying and difficult 
third broadcast, drew the assignment. Again ABC had as its main goal 
equal treatment for the candidates. The same studio which had housed 
Senator Kennedy on the eastern end of the third debate was set up for 
the fourth for both candidates. 
The studio, as we have said, provided excellent production facilities, 
but now with two candidates, ABC cottage builders went back to work 
and constructed an identical dressing-room-cottage for Mr. Nixon. 
These were completely and uniformly furnished in every respect, but 
the floor plan was reversed so that the doorways to the cottages were 
as far apart as possible. After several plans, ranging from "vine-cov-
ered honeymoon" to "contemporary-simple," a modified colonial 
exterior was adopted. They were air-conditioned and each had two 
rooms, one of which included a lavatory but no toilet. A special rest-
room for the candidates, just off the entryway to the studio, was con-
structed out of concrete block, and fixtures were installed in it. The 
cottages' exteriors were completely finished. 
The set for the fourth debate was completely different from that 
used in the third. Designer George Corrin ordered a seamless, painted 
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background in a wood-grained finish. He also designed new rostrums, 
which were similar to the L-shaped units used in the third debate. 
Marshall Diskin all along had wanted the candidates to be closer 
together in the set, because it would be more natural, and would make 
it easier for him to obtain the two-shot reaction shot. Diskin and Corrin 
worked together on the design of the fOl~rth set in order to achieve 
this. The rostrums were placed near the outside edges of a smaller 
platform. They were six feet apart and thus became the closest speak-
ing positions of the debates. The news panel was placed behind four 
separate desks, on the floor opposite the candidates, with a low wall 
behind them similar to the setup for the second debate. The panel, 
however, was much closer to the candidates. The distance between 
them was only about twelve feet. The moderator, Quincy Howe, was 
seated in the middle of the panel. 
The lighting again was routine and smilar to that of the third debate; 
by this time, the floor lights had become standard equipment. Monitors 
with clocks were provided for Nixon and Kennedy. The candidates 
used monitors on the third debate and now requested them. Each 
candidate could watch only his opponent; his own monitor was turned 
off when he spoke. 
Diskin used seven cameras during the program, four on the candi-
dates, two on the newsmen, and a spare.73 The cameras were mounted 
variously on pedestals, Panoram dollies and a Houston crane. More 
shot variations were possible in this debate than in any of the others. 
Not only did Diskin have a set that gave him a great deal of flexibility, 
but he also had the candidates closer together, and the large number 
of cameras and mounts for variation. The candidates' cameras had 
standard lens complements; zoom lenses were used on the cameras 
which shot only the news panel. He used both one-shot and two-shot 
reaction shots, and by this time either the candidates' representatives 
had learned to live with them, or had given up the fight, because there 
is no evidence that anyone mentioned them during the time the show 
was on the air. 
Relieved that the third debate was a success, ABC technicians set 
up the fourth debate giving the same attention to equipment used, 
duplicate channels and lines, and backstopping of the signal delivery 
to the telephone company. 
Diskin used almost the same amount of rehearsal time for the fourth 
debate as he had for the third. He rehearsed with stand-ins for approx-
imately eight hours, including some time on the day before the debate. 
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He worked with the news panel members in their places for an hour, 
and allotted twenty minutes for the candidates during the final pre-
show check. 
The attention to things small and large was universal. Because ABC 
realized that their building was old and not as attractive as some of 
the other debate sites, the order went out to clear and repaint the ramp 
area where the candidates would enter the studio. Special covers were 
made for equipment that could not be moved; part of the outside of 
the building was painted; coveralls and smocks were provided for the 
stage hands; and the crew members were instructed to wear suits. 
With a rambling facility such as ABC's Production Center, the security 
was a little more complicated than it had been elsewhere; so the 
measures started early. The morning of the day before the debate the 
buildings were carefully zoned of[74 
After the program the public comment, and that of the political 
pundits and TV reviewers, was retrospective, and returned to the major 
theme that the format was still a limiting factor, and that the content 
was repetitive. One Washington columnist said: "The debates are 
probably over, and the Washington feeling is that it is none too soon. 
The candidates have been highly repetitive in their answers, and the 
feeling here is that it may not be in the national interest to get into 
strategic plans for dealing with Cuba, Quemoy and Matsu on a presen-
tation of this kind .... "TII 
Fourth Debate: Program Analysis 
OPENING: On a shot of moderator Quincy Howe from a side angle; 
cut to wide shot of candidates, full figure standing in the set; cut 
back to Howe, who introduces Nixon for opening statement. 
Panel introduced after Kennedy's opening statement in a series of 
two-shots, which pan to show each at table-top height. 
SHOTS: Candidates: Shots are almost identical with those used in the 
third debate, and taken in a similar matched order within question 
sequences. Shots are tighter as the program progresses. 
Newsmen: Zoom lenses permit a tightening of some shots as panel 
members ask questions. Shots are from slightly off center, particu-
larly of the moderator, who is located in the center of the panel. 
Reaction: Both two-shot and one-shot reactions. There are five 
shots of Kennedy for a total of 25 seconds, and four of Nixon for a 
total of 31 seconds. Kennedy has two two-shots and three one-shots, 
Nixon two of each. The two-shots are similar to those in Wash-
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ington, with the speaker in the foreground, but the proximity of 
the candidates brings them to more nearly equal size on the screen. 
CLOSING: From one-shot of the last speaker, Nixon, to two-shot of the 
candidates, full figure in the set; cut to Quincy Howe for closing 
wrap-up; cut to high overhead wide shot including set, panel, and 
candidates, for network identification superimposition. 
COMMENT: Audio to Quincy Howe was cut as he cued Kennedy's 
response to a Nixon comment at 21: 35, and the first word or two 
of Kennedy's answer was "up-cut." Direction again was straight-
forward, but candidates' mannerisms during the reaction shots were 
the most vigorous seen in any of the debates, and the candidates 
talked directly to each other numerous times. Just before the time 
for the closing statements Nixon was observed talking to Kennedy 
during a reaction shot, but since his microphone was closed, no 
sound was heard. Howe interrupted Nixon to announce it was time 
for the closing statements. 
THE FIFTH DEBATE 
The number of debates was settled early in the negotiations between 
the networks and the candidates. While it is apparent that the Demo-
crats always wanted more debates than the Republicans, when it came 
to deciding whether there should be a fifth debate, the political con-
siderations in the argument seem to have overwhelmed the two 
camps.76 
The idea of a fifth debate was brought up publicly by Democratic 
Senators Pastore, Monroney, and Magnuson on October 8.77 The trio 
had sponsored the legislation permitting temporary suspension of Sec-
tion 315 of the Communications Act, which made the debates possible. 
Consequently, when they telegraphed the networks that they favored 
a fifth debate closer to election day, the Senators received imme-
diate consideration. The networks implemented the idea immediately, 
and Senator Kennedy wired a blanket acceptance two days later, on 
October 11.78 The Nixon reply the same day was not quite as all-
inclusive, but he did accept the idea of more time. His proposal was to 
extend the fourth debate (which had not yet taken place) to two 
hours, with the second hour to be taken up with questions phoned in 
by the public. 
The situation developed into a barrage of public statements in which 
the candidates accused each other of not wanting to go ahead with the 
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fifth debate idea. Kennedy, in all his public pronouncements about the 
fifth debate, kept hammering away at the idea that the fourth debate 
was too far from election day. And he flatly accused Nixon of being 
afraid to meet him again after October 21. Nixon's television repre-
sentative, Fred Scribner, continued to request an extension of the 
fourth debate to two hours. He proposed that telephone calls with 
questions from the public be handled by a moderator, and that each 
candidate have three minutes to answer. This is essentially what Nixon 
himself did in a nationwide TV marathon answering session from 
Detroit the day before the election. 
On October 19 Scribner called for "immediate meetings" in order to 
discuss the extension of the fourth debate to two hours, and Kennedy 
replied that he was agreeable to an extension, but that it was "in no 
way a substitute for another joint appearance in the final days of the 
campaign. "79 
On the day of the fourth debate Kennedy wired Nixon again, urging 
a fifth debate, and perhaps more. He challenged Nixon to announce 
his acceptance of a fifth debate on the program that night. His wire 
said "In fact I believe that more than five debates would be helpful 
if the record were to be corrected properly."80 
Nixon seems to have been worried about his tactical position in all 
this. There is evidence that on the day of the fourth debate the Nixon 
camp had decided not to become involved in a fifth debate if they felt 
Nixon was ahead in the campaign at the end of the fourth. 81 
The Nixon strategists did, however, hold open the possibility of a 
fifth debate, if Nixon came off second best in the fourth. 82 Nixon also 
proposed turning over the fourth debate to the vice presidential can-
didates, and held out the possibility of a fifth debate if Kennedy agreed 
to this.83 In a I,OOO-word telegram on October 23, Nixon renewed 
the idea of putting the vice presidential candidates on for at least part 
of a fifth debate, and suggested that the whole time period be devoted 
to the question of Cuba, and what to do about Castro-an issue which 
had been touched on briefly during the fourth debate. Nixon's long 
wire devoted much more space to his views on Castro and Kennedy's 
point of view on the same subject than it did to arrangements for the 
fifth debate. Kennedy's reply, on the same day, was similar, since it 
was primarily an attack on Nixon's point of view, although it was 
shorter. But Kennedy rejected the idea of limiting the subject matter 
of the fifth debate to one item.84 
By October 25 the idea of a fifth debate seems to have been given 
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serious consideration by both sides. Scribner and Reinsch met in Wash-
ington to discuss it once more, and the network committee-Mc-
Andrew, Mickelson, Daly, and Keating-met in New York to work 
out a format. They wired Scribner and Reinsch, suggesting a return 
to the original network proposal-one more try for a real "Oregon 
Debate." The wire read: "We urge that you consider reverting to the 
original format; a face to face appearance without a panel, but with 
a moderator to preside and to provide for a fair division of time."85 
The network representatives also suggested another modification of 
this plan-that the candidates present statements on subjects pre-
viously stipulated and that they reserve some time for direct questions. 
Reinsch and Scribner reached no decision on the 25th and met again 
on the 26th. On the 28th the network committee met again, and must 
have been convinced that there really would be a fifth debate. John 
Daly withdrew ABC from the production of the fifth debate, since 
ABC had already presented two, and CBS drew the assignment with 
the probability that it would originate in Washington on October 31. 
The next twenty-four hours must have been the wildest in the entire 
debate series as far as the network committee was concerned. Mickel-
son's personal memoranda on the debates include a complete record 
of the activities.86 While the network committee was meeting in 
Mickelson's office in New York, Reinsch and Scribner were meeting in 
Washington. Faulty communications resulted because all sides were 
firing off telegrams to each other, and releasing the texts of the tele-
grams to the press before they were received at the other end. 
Scribner and Reinsch compromised on a format. First, they decided 
that the two vice presidential candidates, Lynd()fl Johnson and Henry 
Cabot Lodge, would each make a ten-minute statement at the begin-
ning of the program. The presidential candidates would then work 
with a panel of newsmen as they had in the second and third debates, 
with the exception that the answers and comments would continue for 
five minutes. An additional two minutes would then be given the first 
speaker for "surrebuttal." Since twelve and one-half minutes were 
necessary for each complete sequence, time for only three questions 
would remain after the vice presidential candidates finished. Reinsch 
was less in favor of using the vice presidential candidates than Scrib-
ner, but a call from Scribner later in the afternoon indicated that he 
and Reinsch had agreed they would appear on the program.87 
Somewhere along the way, the Republicans suggested that cameras 
be set up in New York's Central Park, so that the candidates could 
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answered questions from anyone who wandered by-a truly soap-box 
approach.88 The networks pointed out that such a plan might attract Ii 
mob of 100,000 persons or more, and that it was impractical from 
the points of view of security, production, and engineering. 
Reinsch and Scribner both asked that the network committee come 
down to Washington the following day, October 29, for a meeting to 
work out production details. Mickelson agreed that he and McAndrew 
would go to Washington for the meeting, and it was scheduled for 
11 A.M. at the CBS Washington headquarters. Reinsch promised to 
call back to confirm the meeting, and it looked as if a fifth debate 
would materialize. 
However, early in the afternoon of the 28th, Reinsch sent a wire 
UI;tder Kennedy's name which Scribner took as a personal affront. 
Scribner felt that the wording of the wire accused him of bad faith, 
and tried to make it look as though the Republicans were resisting the 
fifth debate. Furthermore, he pointed out later, Reinsch released the 
text of the wire close to the time he and Scribner were meeting to 
discuss the final details of the fifth debate.89 
Reinsch did not call back, but sent word to Mickelson late that 
evening that some sort of hitch had developed.90 Mickelson could not 
tell from Reinsch's message whether there would be a fifth debate; he 
and McAndrew went to Washington the following morning. Mickelson 
made contact with both camps. He found Scribner very upset about 
Reinsch's wire. Scribner read Mickelson the text of his reply to 
Reinsch, in which he said that until Kennedy apologized for charging 
bad faith and withdrew what Scribner believed was an ultimatum, 
there could be no more negotiations, and there it ended. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Despite arguments over four debates or five, studio temperature, 
lighting and make-up, color of the background or design of a chair, 
the programs as seen by the millions came off in the way they had 
been planned. The competent network people did their jobs even 
though they were subjected to the most elaborate and often unneces-
sary pressures, some of which they brought upon themselves. Accord-
ing to standards of the industry, the debates were well produced 
public affairs programs. On the living room side of the TV set, the 
programs appeared as straightforward presentations of the candidates. 
The viewer saw little or nothing of the pressure-packed atmosphere 
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which surrounded and shaped the production elements of the programs. 
In the studios these influences and pressures at many times also shaped 
the decisions of everyone involved. 
Format: From a production point of view the formats facilitated a 
simple air show. However, they sharply limited the length of time the 
candidates had to answer questions, and put a premium on the candi-
dates' ability to appear to answer a question in a short period of time. 
The formats did achieve equality of exposure for the candidates. The 
candidates and their representatives dictated the formats to the net-
works. The networks, though they tried to have a different format, 
were more concerned with assuring that the broadcasts of the debates 
would take place. 
Staging: The scenery and lighting introduced no innovations, be-
cause the networks obviously were trying to prevent the staging from 
distracting the viewer. The networks were right in this approach, and 
while there were many influences at work trying to modify and control 
the staging, no one suggested radical departure from the existing 
scenery and lighting. 
Directing: The directing was the implementation of the format. It 
was simple in approach, and carried out with skillful restraint. While 
the directing was basically objective, the reaction shots were admittedly 
subjective. The reaction shots gave power to the director to reveal the 
candidates in a more candid way than the vast majority of the audience 
could otherwise have seen them. 
Technical: The technical elements were subservient to the produc-
tion. The great care taken was a symptom of the networks' concern 
that the debate programs should take place without any failure which 
could be attributed to them. 
Make-up: If the candidates chose to use make-up, they should have 
used professional help. Even so, the do-it-yourself make-up applied 
to Vice President Nixon in the first debate did not affect his appear-
ance as much as his physical condition did. 
Candidates' representatives: The traditional broadcast industry rela-
tionship between the "product representative" and the program pro-
ducer was maintained. Nixon and Kennedy were the products to be 
sold. Scribner, Reinsch, Wilson, and Rogers were the "account execu-
tives" who constantly scrutinized the production elements and 
attempted to influence them in a manner that would favor their man. 
The basic policy agreements between the candidates and the networks 
permitted this partisan activity. 
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In the usual sense of the word the networks did not produce the 
programs-they had no choice concerning the talent, and did not 
choose the time, place, date, or script (format). They provided the 
very best facilities and personnel for the programs, and while they 
accommodated both sides,. they were scrupulously fair. The networks 
came out second best on the formats for the programs, but this, to 
them, was not as important as having the programs on the air. 
It is to the everlasting credit of the television networks that the 
debate programs were presented in the 1960 campaign, but the evi-
dence is overwhelming that they relinquished essential control of the 
_ programs to do so. In only a few instances did the networks assert 
their independence of action. 
If this investigation can be used as a guide for future debates, it is 
clear that one of the major decisions which must be made concerns 
the division of responsibility between the networks and the political 
parties. The one thing that both have in common is a duty to the 
voters. If the content and form of the programs are to be dictated by 
such external considerations as the industry's strategic position vis-
a-vis government regulation, or the candidates' views of how best to 
present themselves, then ultimately the public is the loser. If, on the 
other hand, they use the experience gained to develop equitable ground 
rules formulated with the intent of informing the public in the best 
possible manner, then many of the production and policy difficulties 
will disappear. Certainly our sympathies are with the networks in their 
endeavor to have the debates on the air, and with the candidates for 
their courage in participating, but many of the pressures inherent in 
such a new venture must be removed so that the content is shaped 
only by concern for the best interests of the public. 
NOTES 
1. The authors shared equally in both the research and the writing of this 
study, which was supported by a grant from the Indiana University Faculty 
Research Division. Much of the material was obtained through personal inter-
views, recorded in New York, Washington, and Chicago between March 1 
and May 1, 1961. The authors wish to recognize the help of the corporate vice 
presidents of the three TV networks, the candidates' representatives, Leonard 
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Reinsch and Fred C. Scribner, and many of the program principals, who threw 
open their personal files and helped with the record in a most candid and 
understanding way. 
2. For a full account of the differences between the 1960 arrangements and 
those for the Lincoln-Douglas debates of 1858 see New York Times, Sept. 26, 
1960, p. 25. 
3. See articles by Becker and Lower, Sarnoff, and Stanton, above. 
4. The offer by NBC for eight weekly hour-long broadcasts of "Meet the 
Press" was made by NBC president Robert Sarnoff on April 21, 1960 in a 
speech before the Academy of Television Arts and Sciences in New York. The 
offer by CBS of eight hours of prime evening time between Labor Day and 
Election was made by Dr. Frank Stanton in testimony before the Subcommittee 
on Communications of the Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee 
on May 17, 1960. He proposed a variety of program types. ABC president Oliver 
Treyz, in testimony before the same committee, proposed that each network 
set aside eight hours of its regular programming, picking the most-listened-to 
time periods, and pre-empting the regular programs for special programs by 
the candidates. Sarnoff used the term "The Great Debates" in a wire to House 
Speaker Sam Rayburn in urging House passage .of the Senate resolution. 
5. Kennedy's advisers told the authors they felt it was very important to be 
the first to accept, and thus "challenge" Nixon to the debates. The decision was 
quickly reached during a luncheon at Hyannisport, Mass., July 28. 
6. Not all of these people attended every meeting; the composition of the 
meetings varied depending on what was to be discussed and other considerations 
such as travel schedules. 
7. Leonard Reinsch told the authors that the most difficult part of the 
negotiations was arranging schedules. 
8. McAndrew told the authors that both sides had been working on formats 
between the August 9 and August 31 meetings, and that he felt the candidates 
had virtually agreed on what they wanted before the August 31 meeting. 
9. Text of the telegram from Nixon to the networks is in the networks' 
files; the ellipsis indicated is that of the authors. 
10. Interview with McAndrew, New York, Apr. 6, 1961, also "Ground 
Rules," memo adopted at August 31 meeting. 
11. For a fuller explanation, see "The Oregon Plan of Debating," Quarterly 
lournal of Spet'ch, XII (April 1926), pp. 176-80. 
12. McAndrew, Mickelson files. Stanton testimony before the Senate Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce Committee, Jan. 31, 1961, and interview with 
Reinsch, Washington, Apr. 4, 1961. 
13. Letter from Fred C. Scribner, Apr. 9, 1961. 
14. Interview with Reinsch. 
15. Text of wire from Sarnoff to Representative Harris. 
16. Interviews with Lou Dorfsman, CBS Creative Director for Advertising 
and Sales Promotion, and Don Hewitt, CBS Producer-Director, Apr. 5, 1961. 
17. See note 16. 
18. CBS floor plan provided by Dorfsman; interview with Bob Link, WBBM-
TV Production Manager, Mar. 10, 1961. 
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19. WBBM-TV production services records. 
20. There was considerable disagreement among the principals involved in' 
these developments as to sequence of events. However, it must be said that 
much of this can be attributed to their reluctance to place this responsibility 
on the highest executive level. Dr. Stanton closely supervised the entire opera-
tion. 
21. Interview with Rogers, Apr. 6, 1961. 
22. Interview with Barry, Apr. 5, 1961. 
23. Interviews with Barry and Miss Arvold, Apr. 5, 1961. 
24. Interview with Leonard Reinsch, Washington, Apr. 4, 1961. 
25. Interview with Hewitt. 
26. See note 25. 
27. Interview, AI Pierce, WBBM-TV technical supervisor, Chicago, Mar. 10, 
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30. Interview with Wilson, Apr. 7, 1961. 
31. Sig Mickelson, personal files memorandum, Sept. 15, 1961. 
32. Interview with Virgil Mitchell, WBBM-TV Press Information, Chicago, 
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44. Interview with Slingland. Also interview with Elmer Lower, NBC, Wash-
ington, Apr. 3, 1961. 
45. Interviews with Slingland and Hermanson. 
46. Interview, Leon Chromak, NBC, Washington, Apr. 3, 1961. 
47. See note 46. . 
48. Life magazine, Oct. 17, 1960. 
49. Interview with Chromak. 
50. Wilson said he had suggested to Salinger that some political hay might 
have been made out of the fact that Nixon had more television advisers than 
Kennedy. Wilson feels Salinger communicated this to the Senator, who chose 
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51. Life magazine, Oct. 17, 1960. 
52. Hermanson's personal sketches, NBC set floor plan, shown to the authors. 
53. Interview with Slingland. 
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